WASHINGTON - President Donald Trump said Monday that he is open to meeting Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for three-way talks on nuclear weapons, raising the possibility of an unprecedented gathering while leaving its timing, agenda and even its existence unresolved.

Trump told reporters that he would participate if Xi wanted the meeting and said nuclear weapons and denuclearization should be discussed. His comments followed a Wall Street Journal report that Putin had proposed a meeting among the three leaders, according to the Associated Press.

Reuters reported that the Kremlin said the idea had been discussed and that a meeting could take place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China, on Nov. 18 and 19. The White House has considered the possibility for weeks, Reuters reported, citing a person familiar with the matter.

But no summit has been announced. China has not publicly accepted the proposal, and Reuters said the White House, Kremlin and Chinese foreign ministry did not provide confirmation of an agreed meeting. That distinction matters: an expression of interest is not a diplomatic plan, and the most difficult questions have not yet entered public view.

The United States, Russia and China have never held formal three-way nuclear arms-control negotiations. Washington and Moscow built decades of bilateral agreements around their much larger Cold War arsenals, while Beijing has resisted joining a framework designed for two powers. A trilateral process would have to reconcile different force sizes, military doctrines and definitions of strategic stability.

Trump had previously advocated talks among the three countries during Xi's September state visit to Washington. A White House fact sheet from that meeting said Trump had urged trilateral arms-control discussions and that both presidents intended to attend summits hosted by the other country.

The possible meeting is also entangled with the war in Ukraine. Reuters reported that Putin sought to use a three-way gathering to discuss the conflict, while Trump said the focus should be nuclear weapons and trade. Trump also suggested that someone else should lead negotiations for Ukraine after criticizing President Volodymyr Zelensky.

That creates two separate diplomatic tracks that should not be blurred. Nuclear risk reduction among major powers is a legitimate global objective. Ukraine's sovereignty and territory, however, cannot be treated as bargaining material for leaders meeting without Ukraine at the table.

Dialogue is valuable only when it produces verifiable restraint

A meeting could be useful. Direct communication can reduce miscalculation, clarify military doctrines and create channels for crisis management at a time of intense rivalry. Even limited agreements on launch notifications, testing transparency or emergency contacts can lower the chance that an accident becomes a catastrophe.

Yet the word denuclearization is so broad that it can conceal more than it explains. None of the three governments has presented a public proposal showing which weapons would be limited, how compliance would be inspected or what timetable would apply. A dramatic photograph of three leaders would be diplomatically significant, but it would not itself make any arsenal smaller.

The authoritarian governments in Moscow and Beijing also understand the value of spectacle. Standing beside an American president can grant status and create the appearance that democratic allies and smaller countries are secondary. The United States should pursue talks from strength, consult allies before making commitments and insist that any agreement can be independently verified.

That standard is especially important with Russia waging war against Ukraine and China expanding its military power while concealing much of its decision-making from public scrutiny. Arms control cannot depend on trust alone. It requires inspections, data exchanges, enforcement mechanisms and consequences for deception.

Washington should also avoid allowing a nuclear agenda to become leverage for unrelated concessions on trade or Ukraine. Combining every dispute into one leader-level negotiation may produce headlines, but it increases the risk that one country's security is exchanged for movement on another issue. Durable agreements are usually built by technical teams before leaders sign them, not improvised around a summit table.

The opening still should not be dismissed. American leadership has often been strongest when it pairs military deterrence with a willingness to negotiate under clear rules. Talking to adversaries is not weakness; accepting vague promises without verification would be.

For now, the development is a possibility, not a breakthrough. The next evidence to watch is whether Beijing formally responds, whether diplomats begin preparatory work and whether the three governments define a realistic arms-control agenda. Until then, the distance between an invitation and an agreement remains as important as the idea itself.