WASHINGTON — The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a long-sought civil nuclear cooperation agreement on July 22, creating the legal framework for American companies to take part in the kingdom’s planned nuclear-energy program. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the Section 123 agreement and a separate bilateral safeguards accord in Washington, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.

The signing is a significant strategic step, but it is not a reactor contract and does not by itself authorize Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium. Section 123 agreements establish the conditions under which major U.S. nuclear exports and cooperation may occur; individual transfers still require licenses or other approvals. The administration has released only a brief announcement, not the agreement’s full text, leaving important nonproliferation terms unavailable for public scrutiny.

That gap matters because two people familiar with the agreement described consequential provisions to The Associated Press. One said the framework could open a path to a Saudi uranium-enrichment facility, but only after a joint U.S.-Saudi feasibility study. A second said the pact does not require the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. Those anonymous-source accounts have not yet been independently tested against a published text, and neither claim means an enrichment plant has been approved or is under construction.

An Additional Protocol gives IAEA inspectors broader access to information and locations, helping the agency assess whether undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. Its reported absence would therefore be more than a technical omission. Nonproliferation researcher Alexander Bollfrass told the AP that allowing sensitive nuclear cooperation without that added international oversight would represent a “revolutionary new approach” and could weaken a standard Washington has pressed other partners to accept.

Uranium enrichment is dual-use technology. Low-enriched uranium can fuel civilian power reactors; substantially higher enrichment can produce material usable in a weapon. Operating centrifuges does not itself create a nuclear bomb—weapon design, further processing and delivery systems would still be required—but a domestic enrichment base can shorten the technical path and complicate verification. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously said the kingdom would pursue a bomb if Iran obtained one, intensifying scrutiny of any fuel-cycle provision.

The contrast with the United Arab Emirates will shape the debate. Abu Dhabi’s 2009 nuclear agreement with Washington explicitly renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing, a commitment often called the nonproliferation “gold standard.” U.S. law does not require every Section 123 partner to make that pledge, however. It does require American consent before U.S.-supplied material, or material produced through U.S.-supplied facilities, can be enriched or reprocessed.

The strategic case for the pact is substantial. Saudi Arabia wants dependable electricity for a growing economy, desalination and energy-intensive industry while preserving more oil and gas for export. Bringing that program into a U.S.-led commercial and regulatory system could give American companies access to a market worth billions of dollars, strengthen Washington’s visibility into the kingdom’s plans and reduce incentives for Riyadh to rely on Chinese or Russian suppliers with fewer points of U.S. leverage.

Those advantages explain why walking away is not a cost-free nonproliferation strategy. American involvement can carry high safety standards, export controls and continuing consent rights. But influence is valuable only if Washington uses it. If Riyadh ultimately seeks enrichment, safeguards should be written tightly enough to prevent an ostensibly civilian program from becoming political leverage or the starting point for a regional nuclear competition.

Congress now has the central democratic check. The Energy Department says the agreement has been transmitted for review under the Atomic Energy Act. The Congressional Research Service says the usual process totals 90 days of continuous session—30 days of consultation followed by 60 days of review—and a nonexempt agreement may take effect unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. Lawmakers should insist on the full text, the required proliferation assessment and a clear account of the accompanying bilateral safeguards before allowing that clock to run out.

Key questions include who would own and operate any future fuel-cycle facility, what enrichment level would be allowed, whether reprocessing is barred, how inspectors would detect undeclared activity, and what suspension or return rights Washington could invoke after a violation. A feasibility study could take years and would not settle those policy choices. Nor does the framework guarantee that a U.S. reactor vendor will win a Saudi order.

The agreement could become a durable example of American leadership: keeping a pivotal Middle Eastern partner tied to U.S. technology while placing peaceful nuclear development under enforceable rules. It could also set a risky precedent if commercial competition outruns verification. The distinction will be made not by the signing ceremony, but by the unpublished terms, Congress’s review and the safeguards demanded before any enrichment capability moves from possibility to project.